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The information society is full of strange paradoxes. “On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a 
dog”, yet individual privacy has never been more at risk. Electronic texts may be threatening 
the printed book, but the first flagship of e.com has been a book retailer. ICT (digital 
information and communication technology) has created new kinds of intellectual richness 
and expertise as well as unprecedented forms of techno-disabilities and poverty. The Web 
requires ever better educated people, although it may be run by artificial agents. Cyberspace 
is said to be open, free, democratic and friendly, yet networks are protected by firewalls, 
mailing lists are moderated, sites and databases require userids and passwords, and our 
vocabulary has been expanded by words like “spamming” and “flaming”. The new frontier of 
long-distance education and tailored entertainment also demands increasing parental care to 
avoid ubiquitous pornography (would you allow your children to search for Star Wars’ 
“Princess Leila” on the Web?). The list could easily be expanded. The crucial point is how 
we understand these difficulties. The Social Life of Information (http://www.slofi.com/) is a 
timely, well-informed and very interesting attempt to explain how ICT and the infosphere 
should develop to avoid problems of this kind. 
John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid have a philosophy of information to defend and 
their perceptive diagnosis contains the seeds of a valuable prescription. The infosphere is the 
most plastic reality with which humanity has ever dealt. Its pioneering culture has naturally 
fascinated the American mind, but in the past spatial metaphors have been slightly 
misleading. For we are not merely exploring or taming but rather creating and moulding a 
whole digital universe whose worth and defects mirror our interests, wishes and faults. How 
we create, design, employ and regulate the powerful, digital resources and technologies at our 
disposal is not only of vital importance for the shape that our environment is taking, but also 
a matter of profound moral responsibility towards the present world and future generations. 
What matters is not so much moving bits instead of atoms—this is an outdated, 
communication-based interpretation of the information society that owes too much to mass-
media sociology—as the far more radical fact that the very essence and fabric of reality is 
changing. The information society is better seen as a neo-manufacturing society in which raw 
materials and energy have been superseded by the new digital gold. Not just communication 
and transactions then, but the creation, design and management of information are the keys to 
its proper understanding. From this neo-manufacturing perspective, the main thesis of the 
book can be introduced as an ethical reminder: complete ontological responsibility does not 
entail unregulated freedom. Two simple rules should guide our divine acts of information 
creation and design: there is no information in isolation, and information in context may still 
be worthless without the careful intelligence required to transform it into knowledge and 
meaningful ideas. In the first chapter, Brown and Duguid convincingly argue that 
contemporary datacentrism fails to respect these fundamental constraints. The authors do not 
defend some kind of Heideggerian search for the authentic, over and above the infosphere. 
They know that reality is not hiding in the digital, rather, is being digitised. Their warning is 
that merely informational aspects of life are becoming overimportant at the expense of what 
is not or cannot be reduced to information: the meaning, understanding, knowledge and 
epistemic practices that constitute their social contexts. There is a dangerous shift towards a 
superficial datafication and information-based re-definition of the world of experience; what 
can be done, what can be wanted, what can be threatening etc. may become just types of 
information: sexual, gastronomic, musical, visual, textual and so forth. Even intelligence may 
appear as mere data processing, with strong AI trying to reproduce as much as to redefine 
human understanding, although guesswork, judgement, experience, intuition or discretion 
cannot be reduced to smart algorithms. 
The nineteenth century’s death of God, understood as the transcendental guarantee of 
an objective, cosmological semantics, has been followed by a “second wave” of total 
humanism, which in turn is now being proclaimed moribund by a data-based “third wave” 
that predicts the death of politics, of government, of institutions, of cities and nation-states or 
transnational organisations and other social intermediaries as we know them, in a sort of 
destructuring and boundless hypertextualisation of human relations. The result of this 
datacentrism has been a plethora of hypes and some simplistic obituaries that the authors 
aptly label the 6Ds. Demassification, decentralisation, denationalisation, despacialisation, 
disintermediation and disaggregation have all been predicted as immanent phenomena. 
Wrongly, they argue. For info-enthusiasts correctly acknowledge ICT as one of the most 
powerful forces at work in society, but are mistaken when they view the new landscape it 
makes possible as constituted merely by information and exclusively oriented to the 
individual, implicitly appealing to Moore’s Law (computational power will double every 
eighteen months) as a panacea for any present and future social problem.  
The mistake rests on the blinding simplicity of the CD vs. vinyl interpretative model 
of technological evolution. Why CDs have not replaced the more primitive music cassettes? 
By trying to solve old problems, technological solutions often end splitting, re-shaping and 
diversifying them. In this evolutionary sense, killer applications are rare exceptions. BiC® 
produces “modern” ball pens that have not decreed the death of “old” fountain pens, and 
“old” disposable shavers that are not deadly challenged by more “modern” electric razors. 
Pencils come in a variety of forms, swatches are analogue but trendy and scooters have not 
replaced bicycles. Technological evolution is usually a creative process of binary fission. 
The temptation is to condemn any technological eliminativism (the naïve CD-vinyl 
model) as short-sighted, but with an insightful twist Brown and Duguid speak instead of a 
tunnel-vision, which may be partly justifiable, but is dangerously limited by its disregard for 
the surrounding environment. As they suggest, the way forward may be, paradoxically, to 
look not ahead, but around. Their philosophy of information is a kind of lateral ecologism. 
Too often contextual factors are so pervasive to become unnoticeable to hypermetric 
futurologists. Yet, the importance of the supporting periphery, i.e. the social context in which 
information flourishes and evolves into knowledge, can be overseen but not overestimated 
(one may prefer an electric razor only if easy and constant access to a cheap electric source is 
available; scooters presuppose petrol stations, fuel and garages, and so on). 
From chapter two onwards, Brown and Duguid analyse six specific domains in which 
technological eliminativism mistakes gradual evolutions, mutations and adaptations for mere 
catastrophic changes. The discussion is carefully and systematically based on actual cases 
and it never turns into the boring collection of pointless, if entertaining, anecdotes, so 
common in the literature on the social impact of ICT. The worlds of negotiation, information 
brokering and artificial agents, of the home office and tele-jobs, of work organisation, of 
learning, of research and innovation, of the electronic media and of long-distant education are 
thoughtfully assessed, with a wealth of brilliant intuitions. In each case, the authors show 
how ICT may run the risk of throwing away the surface constraints (e.g. the dangerous 
sharpness of the old razor) with the substantial hidden resources (e.g. the old razor’s total 
independence of any energy technology). In the north of the world, people live in an 
increasingly designed reality. The Social Life of Information does not contain a gloomy 
catalogue of pre-conceived solutions or neo-luddite prescriptions of what we ought to do. It is 
a circumstantial and constructive reminder of the importance of all the semantic and social 
constraints that we need to respect in order to build a better infosphere. It should be read by 
anyone interested in understanding the future. 
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